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SOME INFLUENCES OF JUSTICE HOLMES' THOUGHT
ON CURRENT LAW-CONTRACTS WITH THE
UNITED STATES-SUITS AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES.
By Perlie P. Fallon*
CONTRACTS WITH THE UNITED STATES
T HE CASES in which Justice Holmes wrote opinions in this
field of law for the United States Supreme Court may be
generally classified as follows:
(1) The effect of Congressional authorizations;
(2) The bases of construction;
(3) The controling elements of public policy and their
relation to construction.
(4) The constitutional power to exercise control over per-
formance by statute.
(5) Mistake of fact in transactions with the United States.
Effect of Congressional Authorization
In Goodyear Co. v. United States' the petitioner's prede-
cessor had leased premises in Cincinnati to the United States for
use of the Veteran's Bureau. The lease was made in 1921 for a
term ending in 1926 at a stipulated 'annual rental payable in
monthly installments. No appropriation was available to pay the
rent after the fiscal year ending June 30th., 1922. The lease stipu-
lated that if an appropriation was not made for payment of the
rent for any succeeding fiscal year the lease would terminate as
of June 30th. of the year for which an appropriation was last
available. The Veteran's Bureau gave notice it wished to give up
the lease as of June 30th., 1923, and would not pay rent beyond the
period of actual occupancy, although an appropriation had been
made to cover the fiscal year ending June 30, 1924. Possession was
continued to December 20, 1923 when the premises were vacated
and the rent paid to December 31, W23. The petitioner claimed for
the rent to June 30th., 1924. It was held that under Secs. 3732 and
*Mfember of the bar of New York and the Supreme Court of the United
States.3(1928) 276 U.S. 287,48 S.C. 306, 72L. E. 575.
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3679 of the Revised Statutes2 in the absence of appropriation
running beyond the fiscal year, the lease could only be binding on
the United States by an appropriation and action by officers of the
United States affirmatively continuing the lease. Here the lease
had not been so continued beyond the period of occupancy. Justice
Holmes disagreed, saying that the officers' statement was merely a
refusal to accept the legal consequence of the action since under
the local law the lease was renewed for a year and the appropriation
was sufficient. The point which he made here did not rest on con-
tract implied in law but on the construction of the statute. The
statute made the contract binding where there was an appropria-
tion, which there was, and the affirmative act of the officers in
holding over when viewed in relation to the local law was an act
continuing the lease to the end of the current fiscal year.
Bases of Construction
In the construction of contracts with the United States Justice
Holmes has emphasized two rules of law. First, the Government
was entitled to the benefit of the contract as it was made. Second,
where services and benefits were delivered to the government on the
basis of the contract made and compensation under the contract
paid and accepted a rule of quantam valebat would not be applied
to secure more by way of contract construction. The decisive factor
in applying both of these rules was the construction which the
parties had placed on the contract while it was in process of execu-
tion. This last approach brings out the quantum valebat nature of a
claim when the construction of the contract as claimed and the
actions taken under it are brought into contrast.
In St. Louis Hay and Grain Co. v. United States' a quarter-
master had advertised for hay for use in a military camp. The
right to increase or decrease the quantities, not exceeding twenty
per cent, was reserved and also "if the troops should b'e wholly or
in part withdrawn, the awards shall become inoperative to the
extent of such reduction." The hay was not taken "to begin within
five days from the date of award, and proceed at daily rates of at
least one-sixtieth of amount" as the delivery clause provided, but
"in such quantities and at sucltimes afterwards, as may be desig-
nated by the chief quarter-master" which was a further limitation
in the contract and deliveries had proceeded on a rising market
2Now 41 U. S. C. A. Sec. II; 31 U. S. C. A. Sec. 665.
3(1903) 191 U. S. 159, 24 S. C. 47, 48 L. E. 130.
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until all but 255,291 pounds had been delivered out of the 9,000,000
specified. Payment had been made and accepted. The delay was
made the basis of a claim. The claim was held without merit in
view of the right to make changes expressly reserved in the con-
tract. In Simpson v. United States4 the Commissary General
of Subsistence had made a contract by which the claimant had
agreed to deliver beef to the commissaries of troops stationed at
posts and camps "in the interior of the island of Cuba:" Damages
for refusal to take beef for troops at Los Quenados, Havana, and
Matanzas were refused as flying in the face of the contract "which
confines the undertaking of the United States to beef for camps in the
interior." Conversations before the contract was made, and an
occasional supplying of beef at Los Quenados, where another con-
tractor had a plant which was notice "on the face of the earth," did
not change the result. In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Con-
pany v. United States5 an unusually large and expensive switch
board installed for the purpose of performing a contract to furnish
telephone equipment and service to the War Department was held
to be within the contract and not subject to a claim for the cost
of installation less salvage. The most notable of these series of
cases is Atlantic Gidf and Pacific Company v. Philippine Islands.6
A contract had been made for the extension to the Luneta
of the City of Manila. The contract expressly stated that the con-
tractor would be responsible for damages to the bulkhead by wave
action but the Government would pay for repairs if a break was
caused by pressure resulting from mud-fill. On May 1st, 1906, the
mud-fill caused about 200 feet of the bulkhead to give way and
a large quantity of the fill escaped into the bay. On May 18th.,
before repairs could be made, a typhoon occurred and about 1800
feet of the bulkhead was destroyed by the wind and wave action
and the escaped fill. If the prior break had not-happened no damage
would have been done by the typhoon. Justice Holmes gave the
Government the exact benefit of the contract made. There was
no issue of tort. To what extent did the Government assume the
risk? The contractor must offer the completed work. The ulterior
consequence of the break rested on it.
In all of these cases the point is emphasized also that pro-
ceedings in discharge of the contract had gone forward on the basis
of the contract-the test of the action of the parties as a determina-
4 (1905) 199 U. S. 397, 26 S. C. 54, 50 L. E. 245.
5(1930) 281 U. S. 385, 50 S. C. 343, 74L. E. 921.
0(1910) 219 U. S. 17, 31 S. C. 138, 55 L. E. 70.
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tion of construction. In St. Louis Hay and Grain Co. v. United
States, supra, the contract was held by the lower court to be invalid
since'it was not reduced to writing pursuant to Section 3744 of
the Revised Statutes.7  But Justice Holmes said that since the
contract had been performed its invalidity Was now immaterial. In
Simpson'v. United States, supra, indefinite oral agreements and
interpretations after the event gave way to "contemporary con-
struction by men on the spot."8  In Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company v. United States, supra, the contract was held
to prevail over expressions of dissatisfaction by the contractor.
The point respecting performance is brought out sharply in New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railway Company v. United
States.9 A large quantity of gold had been offered for trans-
port as fourth class mail matter at parcel-post gates by the Treasury
Department. The appellant had rendered the service and been
paid and accepted the sums covered by its contract with the Post-
office Department. It argued this was not "mail service." Justice
Holmes wrote that, whether it was mail service or not, it had been
rendered and paid for Without protest.
On these construction issues there is a reflection of Justice
Holmes' attitude in Justice Murphy's opinion in United States v.
Blair.10 A contractor sought to finish the construction of
buildings for the Veteran's Administration in 314 days under a
contract by which he was allowed 420 days. He alleged he had
been delayed by the failure of a concurrent contractor to proceed
promptly with plumbing, -heating and electrical work and the
failure of the Government to either get this work done or terminate
the contract. A further ground of claim was based on unauthorized
acts, rulings and instructions of the Government Superintendent
and his assistant. The first ground of the claim was rejected be-
cause there was nothing in the contract by which the Government
had assumed an obligation to aid in the completion of the contract
prior to the time agreed. The second was rejected because the
administrative appeals provided by the contract had not been
taken. Justice Holmes had consistently refused to go one inch
beyond the contract terms in order to fix a liability upon the United
States. The second ground of the decision in the Blair case is more
fully stated in United States v. Callahan Wgalker Co." namely,
7Formerly 41 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16, repealed Oct. 21, 1941.
SPage 400 of 199 U. S. See footnote 4.
9(1922) 258 U. S. 32, 42 S. C. 209, 66 L. E. 448..-
10(1944) 321 U. S. 730, 64 S. C. 820, 88 L. E. 1039.
"1(1942) 317U. S. 56, 63 S. C. 113,87 L. E. 49.
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that questions of fact such as the cost of digging, moving and plac-
ing earth and a reasonable and customary allowance of profit are
enquiries of fact and more easily ascertainable by administrative
procedures. In United States v. Rice,'2 there also were con-
current contracts for building and installation of plumbing, heating
and electrical equipment. The contractor doing the latter work was
delayed by reason of subsurface difficulties encountered by the
building contractor. There was enough in the contract to show the
Government had reserved the right to interrupt the work and even
to suspend construction, if it were deemed necessary. The claim
for breach of contract was held without merit in the general law.
The special clauses of the contract were construed to give the
contractor an extension of the time of performance and not to
create a basis of additional payment. There is also found in United
States v. Brooks-Callaway Co.'s a reflection of Holmes' ap-
proach in Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company v. Philippine Is-
lands.'4 There the Standard Form of Government Con-
struction Contract was construed. Delay had been caused in the
completion of a contract for the construction of levees on the
Mississippi River. The delay had been due to high water. Article
9 of the contract relieved the contractor from liquidated damages
caused by delays due to unforseeable causes beyond his control
and without his fault or negligence and a specifying provision
included "floods." The United States had deducted damages for
the delay and the contractor sought to recover. It was held that
the clause related to the unexpected and therefore -there must be
a finding of fact that the high waters were not forseeable. The
contractor as in the Philippine Islands case was held to have as-
sumed in the contract all which was not expressly excused.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.'5 the contract was
so clear that it was hardly open to construction. So it has no place
in this part of my paper. It may be necessary to keep it in mind
when Justice Holmes' attitude on the powers of United States' of-
ficers in relation to contracts and issues of public policy are con-
sidered.
12(1942) 317 U. S. 61, 63 S. C. 120, 87 L. E. 53.
'3(1943) 318 U. S. 120, 63 S. C. 474,-87 L. Ed. 653.
14See footnote 6.
15(1942) 315 U. S. 289, 62 S. C. 581, 86 L. E. 855. At the other pole of
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. since it involves fraud by the use of
collusive bidding is United States ex iel. Marcus v. Hess, (1943) 317 U. S.
537, 63 S. C. 379, 87 L. E. 443. There an informer was permitted to recover
in a qui tam suit double damages and fixed penalties under 31 U. S. C. Secs.
231-234.
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Public Policy Factors
Justice Holmes' greatest contribution in this field of the law
was that of stating the controling elements of public policy which
govern contracts with the United States and the relation of that
public policy to questions arising in the construction of such con-
tracts.
Hazelton v. Shecels 6 was an action for specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell for $9,000 land respecting which legisla-
tion was pending for its acquisition as a hall of records. The re-
cital of consideration set out services in bringing the property to
the attention of the committees of Congress as a suitable and ap-
propriate site for a hall of records and the expenditure of time,
labor, and money in such services including drawing a legislative
bill for the purchase or condemnation of the land. The land had
been sold to the Government for $14,395.30. In dismissing the
bil, Justice Holmes pointed out that the services were an essential
part of the consideration. The offer invited and tended to induce
improper solicitations. The objection to them rested in their tend-
ency and not what was done in a particular case. If part of the
consideration was contrary to public policy the whole promise
falls. The public policy which Holmes had in mind here no doubt
rested on the basis of duty, a concept which is a little short of
fiduciary relation. In the presence of such a concept the law does
not wait for actual fraud but raises the theory of constructive
fraud. This involves not the will or motive of the actor but a gain
or a detriment, flowing from the failure to observe the express or
implied obligations which arise from the surrounding circum-
stances.
In United States v. New York and Porto Rico Steanship
Company'7  and Acherland v. United States' he declared
that the purpose of Rev. Stats., Sec. 374419 which made it the
duty of the Secretaries of War, the Navy and the Interior to cause
every contract made by their authority on behalf of the Govern-
ment "to be reduced to writing, and signed by the contracting
parties with their names at the end thereof" was to prevent pos-
sible frauds upon the Government by officers. In the former case
'16 (1906) 202 U. S. 71, 25 S. C. 567, 50 L. E. 939. See Muclzany v. United
States,* (1945) 324 U. S. 49, '65 S. C. 442, 89 L. E. 492, where option con-
tracts for the sale of land to the United States were held valid in which a
soliciting agent appointed by the War Department was paid a 5% fee based
on the sum paid by the United States and such fee to be paid by the vendor.
17 (1915) 239 U. S. 88, 36S. C. 41, 60 L. E. 161.
18 (1916) 240 U. S. 531, 36 S. C. 438, 60 L. E. 783.
19 Formerly 41 U. S. C. A. Sec. 16, repealed Oct. 21, 1941.
HOLMES' THOUGHT ON CURRENT LAW
he wrote for the Court in holding a shipping contractor liable for
failure to perform tenders which he had accepted for the trans-
portation of coal. The argument made was that the contract was
not binding on the shipping contractor because not in conformity
with the statute. It was rejected. In the latter case the court per-
mitted reformation of a contract relating to the transportation of coal
where a clause which the parties had agreed to delete was by mis-
take carried into the formal contract.
Constitutional Power Over Performance
In Ellis v. United Sta.tes,20 there ,was an indictment for
violation of the Act of August 1, 1892, C. 352, 27 Stat. 34021
relating to the limitation of hours of service of laborers and
mechanics employed upon public works of the United States. The
contractors had been found guilty of working employees who were
within the statute more than eight hours in a calendar day and in
absence of an extraordinary emergency. The argument that the
Government had waived its sovereignty by making the contract
and that a breach of the statute could only be a breach of the con-
tract was dismissed as a mere confusion of ideas. Justice Holmes
stated that by making a contract the Government did not give up
its power to make a law consistent with its views of public policy
and punish a departure. This dual character of the Government
has been recognized in the more recent cases involving the in-
clusion or exclusion of Federal taxes affecting materials contracted
for by Government agencies. Thus in United States v. Kansas
Flour Corporation,22 it was held that a clause in a contract,
whereby the price was to be "increased" or "decreased" if taxes
were imposed on the processing of the flour, released the United
States from paying that part of the contract price which offset
such a tax when the collection of the tax was restrained by the
courts because it was invalid. This right of adjustment, however,
rests upon the contract terms as was pointed out in United States
v. Standard Rice Co. 23  There the contract contained no pro-
vision for decrease of the price by reason of tax adjustments and
it was held that the Government could not offset in its settlements
the savings which arose by reason of the processing tax having
been declared invalid.
Now we must return to an extension of the rule of Ellis v.
20(1906) 206 U. S. 246, 27 S. C. 600, 51 L. E. 1047.21Now 40 U. S. C. A. Sec. 321.
22(1941) 314 U. S. 212,62 S. C. 232, 86 L. E. 159.
23(1944) 323 U. S. 106, 65 S. C. 145, 89 L. E. 112.
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United States24 and a case where Justice Holmes pointed out
that the Government has power in certain fields to fix the price
at which material is to be supplied to it. In Hollis v. Kutz,
25
a bill in equity had been brought against the Public Utilities Com-
mission of the District of Columbia by private consumers of gas
for the purpose of having certain increases in the rates for gas
to private consumers declared void. The point made was that
the rates established were void as a matter of law because the rate
to be charged to the United States and to the District remained
the statutory rate of 70 cents and if the United" States and the Dis-
trict had paid 90 cents the gas company would have received a
return of six percent. Holmes declared that the notion that the
Government could not make it a condition of allowing the establish-
ment of gas works that its needs and the needs of its instrument the
District should be satisfied at any price that it might fix required
no answer.
Mistake of Fact
In the field of mistake of fact in dealings with the United States
Justice Holmes wrote but one opinion. In United States v. Na-
tional Exchange Bank2 6 the United States sued to recover
the difference between the amount to which a check paid by it had
been fraudulently raised and the amount for which the check was
drawn. The check had been drawn upon the Treasurer of the
United States by the United States Veteran's Bureau in favor of
one Beck for $47.50. It had been raised to $4750 and paid by the
Treasurer in that amount. Holmes wrote that the ground of recov-
ery for a mistake of fact is that the fact-supposed was the conven-
tional basis or tacit condition of the transaction. He held therefore
that in" paying an order on itself the United States had notice of the
amount and in paying an" innocent holder it dealt at arms length
and took the risk. The largeness of the business did not change
the rule. If the drawee's name had been forged the rule would
have been different as was pointed out in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States.2
7
24See footnote 19.
25(1921) 255 U. S. 452, 41 S. C. 371, 65 L. E. 727. See also United States
v. Cowden Mfg. Co., (1941) 312 U. S. 34, 61 S. C. 411, 85 L. E. 497; where
it was held that the taxes did not directly apply to the contractor.
26(1926) 270 U. S. 527; 46 S. C. 388, 70 L. E. 717.
27(1943) 318 U. S. 363, 63 S. C. 573, 87 L. E. 838. See also
Metropolitan Bank v. United States, (1945) 323 U. S. 454, 65 S. C. 354, 89
L. E. 386, where the checks were fraudulently issued by a civilian clerk in
the Paymaster's office of the Marine Corp. The United States recovered
upon the basis of the guaranty of the indorsements.
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SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Here I have become involved in the matter of drawing lines.
Some of Justice Holmes' cases which I shall place here might
have been put under my first heading. The only justification I
can make is that lines are sometimes necessary and when you have
lines there are always some cases which are so close to the line that
it seems a matter of discretion only where to place them. However,
I feel that it is necessary to place the cases now to be discussed in
a separate group because factually they depend upon situations
where (1) there is an issue as to whether the United States is
the real party in interest within the rule that forbids suits against
a sovereign without its consent; and (2) the obligations involved
are implied. The latter probably fall within the broader scope of
the law of contracts but at least stand separate to the extent that
express obligation is lacking and the claim can only be supported
on an obligation implied from law or fact.
I shall take the groups in the order which I have stated them
and note first those cases which are concerned with the rule that
a sovereign may not be sued without its consent. The broad rule
itself is not so often involved in the cases in which Justice Holmes
wrote opinions but most often the application of the rule and the
implications which arise from the rule as a matter of law.
In Internati;ial Supply Co. v. Bruce2 the owner of letters
patent for a cancelling and postmarking machine brought a bill in
equity to restrain the postmaster at Syracuse, New York, from
using machines alleged to infringe the complainant's patents. The
machines were used by the defendant's subordinates in the service
of the United States. Holmes wrote that although the United
States was a lessee and not an owner of the machines it had a
right to their use which was a right in rein and this right could not
be interfered with behind its back and it could not be made a party
to the suit. There are recent cases which apply in different cir-
cumstances the law which he stated in the Bruce case. Thus in
Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Conwtruction Co. 2 9 an action for
damages was brought in the Nebraska courts against a contractor
of the United States on the ground that in the course of the work
done pursuant to a contract with the United States and directed
to the improvement of the Missouri River artificial erosion had
been created which washed away a part of the plaintiff's land. Since
28(1904) 194 U. S. 601, 24 S. C. 820, 48 L. E. 1134.
29(1940) 309 U. S. 18, 60 S. C. 413, 84 L. E. 554. See also Tennessee
Power Co. v. T. V. A., (1939) 306 U. S. 118, 137, 59 S. C. 366, 83 L. E. 453.
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the work was done by power validly conferred on the contractor
it was held that the action would not lie. The taking of the property
raised a different issue. In United States v. Griffen.3 it was
held that a suit against the Interstate Commerce Commission under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913 (now 28 U. S.
C. A. Sec. 41, subd. (28)), granting the District Courts jurisdiction
to review orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the
purpose of reviewing an order fixing rates respecting compensa-
tion for carrying mails, would not lie, since it was in the final
analysis a suit against the United States. This case is also interest-
ing because it follows the view that the United States may limit
review of its contract arrangements to an administrative review,
a position previously announced in Dismuke v. United States.31
In Sage v. United States3 2 Holmes dealt with the nature of a
suit against a collector of Internal Revenue for refund of United
States taxes. A tax had been levied and collected upon the passing
of certain legacies. Later it was held that such legacies were not
within the terms of the tax statute because they had not vested.
A claim for refund was filed and denied and later prosecuted to
judgment against the Collector and satisfied by the United States.
Subsequent decisions opened up certain of the legacies, which had
been held taxable in the prior suit, to claims for refund. Suit was
brought against the United States which pleaded the judgment
against the Collector as a bar. Holmes held that although the United
States had made statutory provisions respecting such claims (now
28, U. S. C. A. Sec. 842; 31 U. S. C. A. Sec. 725 q (6); 26
U. S. C. A. Sec. 3722) nevertheless the United States was not
privy to such a suit and the resulting judgment was not a
judgment against or in favor of the United States. Any
claim against the United States arises from the subsequent
official act and not from the judgment. The right to sue the Col-
lector in a District Court rested .on what is now 28 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 41, Subd. (5). Suits against the United States go on a dif-
ferent footing. 28 U. S. C. A. See. 41 Subd. (20). After 1921
the jurisdiction of the District Court was opened up as to suits
against the United States where the Collector was dead or out
of office. The Court in defining these various jurisdictions in
Lowe Bros. Co. v. United States3 followed the rule laid down
so(1938) 303 U. S. 226, 58 S. C. 601, 82 L. E. 764.
31(1936) 297 U. S. 167, 56 S. Ct. 400, 80 L. Ed. 561.
32(1919) 250 U. S. 33, 39 S. C. 415, 63 L. E. 828.
83(1938) 304 U. S. 302, 58 S. C. 896, 82 L. E. 1362. See also Graham &
Foster v. Goodcell, (1931) 282 U. S. 409, 430, 51 S. C. 186, 75 L. E. 415.
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in the Bruce case that the suit against the Collector was personal
and, carrying out that idea, held that the collection of the tax by
the Collector was a sine qua non of jurisdiction. The crediting of
an overpayment for 1918 to a 1917 deficiency was not enough.
A political form of recent development is governmental action
on an extensive scale through corporations. Thus the Shipping'
Act of September 7, 1916, anticipating the possibility of war,
established a Shipping Board and gave it power to form a corpora-
tion under the laws of the District of Columbia for the purchase,
construction and operation of merchant vessels. The Board was
authorized to purchase not less than a majority of the corporate
stock. The corporation was formed and among its other actions
made contracts for the building of sixteen wooden vessels by the
Sloan Shipyards Corporation. Later the corporation changed its
plans and terminated the contract. A suit for breach of contract
and for the recission of a subsequent contract was filed in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington. The claim was for more than $10,000 and the bill was
dismissed on the ground that the suit must be brought in the Court
of Claims. The theory on which this result was based was that
the suit was one against the United States. Sloan Shipyards v.
United States Fleet Corporation,34 Holmes writing for a
judgment of reversal refused to be influenced by "the enormous
powers ultimately given to the Fleet Corporation." He declined
to hold that the Fleet Corporation "was so far put in place of the
sovereign as to share the immunity of the sovereign from suit."
Such a notion he wrote "is a very dangerous departure from one
of the first principles of our system of law" because "the general
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction always is amenable
to the law." He pointed out that the corporation under its charter
was capable of suing and being sued. His opinion appears to me
to go deeper than intention and to extend to the question of power.
The argument advanced to support the Fleet Corporation's con-
tention would have left inoperative the rule that a sovereign's agent
must justify his acts. What we are witnessing here is a clash
between differences of approach. Discussion of political and his-
torical significances do not belong here since we are only concerned
with questions of law. The dignity of the sovereign which was
perhaps the ancient root of his immunity is necessarily a part of
the legal fabric. Later, in 1939, the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
34(1922) 258 U. S. 549,42 S. C. 386,66 L. E. 762.
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poration and its subsidiaries went so far as to claim immunity from
suit in a case where damages were asked for negligence in dis-
charging cattle feeding contracts. The immunity was denied. The
reasoning is narrower than in the Sloan Shipyards case and pro-
ceeds upon the ground of Congressional intention.3 5  The
garnishment cases of which Federal Land Bank v. Priddy36
and Federal Housing Administration v. Burr,87 are examples
also go on the ground of Congressional intention.
In Olson v. United States Spruce Co.38 Justice Holmes
pointed out that the Dent Act (Sec. 50 U. S. C. A. Sec. 80 p. 91),
which gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction of certain claims
against the United States, did not contemplate suits against cor-
porations in the Court of Claims. The plaintiffs alleged they had
devoted their logging camp to the production of airplane timber
upon the assurances of agents of the United States that the latter
would pay for what the plaintiffs had been requested to do. A
claim under the Dent Act seems to have been filed earlier and to
have been disallowed by the Secretary of War. The plaintiffs then
brought this action against the intermediate contractor in a State
court and it was removed to a District Court and dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. Holmes reversed this result saying that there
might be a cause of action on the merits and even if the Dent Act
was a bar it would go to the merits rather than jurisdiction. He
pointed out that the Dent Act did not contemplate suits against
corporations in the Court of Claims. The law in this case comes
out more clearly in United States v. Sherwood, 9 decided in
1941: There a judgment creditor in New York secured authority
under Sec. 795 of the New York Civil Practice Act to sue the
United States under the Tucker Act (28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 41 (20))
to recover damages for breach of a contract with the judgment
debtor. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal on the
ground the matter was controlled by the State law. The Supreme
Court, on certiorari, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. It
pointed out that jurisdiction in suits against the United States is gen-
erally vested in the Court of Claims. Title 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 41
(20) created concurrent jurisdiction in the District Court of Claims
not exceeding $10,000 in certain limited cases of contract and dam-
85(1939) Keifer 6& Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 59 S. C. 516, 83
L. E. 784. Tennessee Power Co. v. T. V. A., note 27, has a place here also.36(1935) 295 U. S. 229, 55 S. C. 705, 79L. E. 1408.
37(1940) 309 U. S. 242, 60 S. C. 488, 84 L. E. 724.
38(1925) 267 U. S. 462, 45 S. C. 357, 69 L. E. 738.
39 (1941) 312 U. S. 584, 61 S. C. 767, 85 L. E. 1058.
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ages not sounding in tort. The Court of Claims is a legislative and
not a constitutional court and subject to such limitations as Con-
gress may place upon it in granting the consent to a suit including
dispensation with jury trials. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
is restricted to the adjudication of suits brought against the Govern-
ment alone. Here the validity of the plaintiff's right to the claim
must be adjudicated in order to give complete relief. The District
Court could exercise both of these jurisdictions. But the District
Court had no more authority under the Tucker Act than to sit
as a Court of Claims and the United States had not consented to
be sued except where the issues were between the claimant and the
Government. On the practical side the Government would be re-
quired to make sure the plaintiff had authority to relinquish the
debtor's claim in so far as it exceeded $10,000 or be subjected to
successive suits.
There are points at which different fields of law merge. The
lines which mark them off become indistinct. Thus while we are
not here concerned with the taxation of instrumentalities of the
United States we come upon cases which might be classified either
there or in the field of law we are now considering. This arises
from the fact that some tax cases also raise the point that the
citizen cannot sue the sovereign. In Baltimore Shipbuilding Co.
v. Baltimore-0 certain land had formerly belonged to the
United States which had conveyed it to the appellant. The con-
dition of the deed was that a dry-dock be constructed on the property
for the use of vessels belonging to the United States and if the
land was diverted to any other use or the dock became unfit for
use for a period of six months the property was to revert to the
United States. The city of Baltimore laid a tax upon the appellant's
interest. The tax was resisted on the ground it was beyond the
taxing power of the state. Justice Holmes pointed out that there
are different interests in land such as life estates and remainders.
The tax in such cases could only be enforced against the interest
concerned. Here there was a condition subsequent and the United
States had no right in rem. The fee was in the appellant and any
sale of the interest would be subject to the condition. Since the
appellant was a private corporation for gain its employment by the
United States was not within the instrumentality rule. 4'
The recent cases which have been concerned with this' theory
40(1904) 195 U. S. 375, 25 S. C. 50, 49 L. E. 242.
41 Cf. Callam County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 341, 44 S. C.
121, 68 L. E. 328.
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of the law have presented the reverse situation to that with which
Holmes dealt in the Ba4~imore Shipbuilding Case. Thus in Mdlen~
Benevolent Corp. v. United Stotes,,4 2 it was held that lands
acquired by the United States which had been subject to local im-
provement assessments could not be reached for further assess-
ments to make up deficiencies necessary t6 pay. off the bonds issued
(the outstanding assessments had been fixed on acquisition). In
Maricopa County v. Valley Bank4" it was held that shares of
preferred stock of national banks held by the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation were not subject to state taxation where Con-
gress had provided otherwise by statute. The liens which had
attached prior to the passage of the statute could not be enforced
because the statute must be deemed a withdrawal of any consent to
be sued. It is here that we reach the point where the different fields
of law seem to merge in the single point of the immunity of the
sovereign, and this situation is illustrated further by United States
v. Alabama -4 where state taxes which had become a lien prior
to the purchase of the property by the United States were held
constitutionally valid but it was also held that they could not be
enforced against the United States without its consent.
We now turn to a different aspect of sovereign liability, namely,
how far, if at all, the United States opens itself to claims in the
nature of counter-claims and offsets when it comes into court and
asks for affirmative relief. The right to set up and have the benefit
of offsets is established by statute where the Government voluntarily
sues and the claim so offset has been presented to the General Ac-
counting Office for examination and disallowed or such presenta-
tion excused within the grounds set out in the statute. 28 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 774. United States v. Wilkins45 indicates that the statute
includes credits arising out of any transaction as well as credits
arising out of the transaction in suit.
The case in which Justice Holmes wrote on this matter is United
States v. The Thekla.46 It raised a different issue than the
situation covered by the statute. It went to the question of how
far an affirmative recovery could be made over and above setoff. It
presented a particular situation since it arose under the admiralty
law. The owners of the steamship F. J. Luchenbach libelled the
42(1933) 290 U. S. 89 54 S. C. 38, 78 L. E. 192.
48 (1943) 318 U. S. 357, 63 S. C. 587,87 L. E. 834.
44(1941) 313 U. S. 274, 61 S. C. 1011, 85 L. E. 1327.
45(1821) 6 Wheat. 135, 144; 5 L. E. 225.
46(1924) 266 U. S. 328, 45 S. C. 112, 69 L. E. 313.
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barque Thekla. The latter filed a cross libel and the proceedings
were consolidated. The United States came in upon its own motion
and stood on the steamship's libel. It filed a claim "without sub-
mitting itself to the jurisdiction of the court" and alleged possession
and ownership of the steamship at the time when the libel was filed.
The Fleet Corporation filed a stipulation reciting that the steamship
was under requisition charter to the United States and in possession
of the United States at the time of the collision; that if there was
any liability it was that of the United States and the Fleet Corpora-
tion agreed in case of default by the claimant that execution should
issue against its chattels and lands in the sum of $130,000. At the
trial it was found that the steamship alone was at fault and a decree
was made against the claimant and stipulator for the damages in
the sum of $120,619.71. One of the grounds relied upon by the
Government was that a claim that would not constitute a cause of
action against the Government could not be asserted as a counter-
claim. Here there was something more than offset because the
steamship being found alone at fault was under the admiralty law
required to bear the entire damage which meant the awarding of
an affirmative claim regardless of any rule of offset. Justice Holmes
decided this part of the case on the point that the submission of the
United States was an agreement by implication that justice should
be done with regard to the subject matter pursuant to admiralty
law. The libel, he wrote, was like a bill for an account and im-
ported an offer to pay the balance if it should turn out against the
party bringing the bill.
The Court in recent cases has limited the rule in The Thekla
case to the admiralty basis on which it rests. Thus in the United
States v. ShaW47 it was held that the probate court in Michigan,
acting under the established state practice respecting administration
of estates, could not allow a cross claim against the United States in
excess of setoff. The United States had not consented to the
prosecution of a suit against it in the Probate Court by the filing
of the claim against the estate. The same rule was applied in United
States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.48 There the
United States had filed a claim on behalf of its Indian wards. It
was held that the filing of the claim did not authorize the allowance
of the debtor's cross claim in a larger amount and the fixing of a
credit against the United States. The action in thus allowing the
credit was not res judicata in a subsequent litigation.
47(1940) 309 U. S. 495, 60 S. C. 640, 84 L. E. 881.
48(1940) 309 U. S. 506, 60 S. C. 653, 84 L. E. 894.
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We may well doubt if Justice Holmes would have decided the
two cases last discussed differently and thus gone beyond the ad-
miralty basis on which The Thekla rests. The reason of our doubt
rests in the disposition he made of questions relating to the allow-
ance of interest in situations such as The Thekla presented. In The
Thekla Case interest was allowed. But in Boston Sand and Gravel
Company v. United States49 and United States v. Commonwealth
Line,50 where special statutes created jurisdiction and permitted
suit where collisions occurred between United States ships and
other vessels and created authority to enter a decree for damages
and costs, he refused to construe the statute so as to allow interest
on a recovery against the United States. The United Staes was held
liable only in so far as it had expressly committed itself to pay and
to waive the bar against suit.
Finally we come to the second division of suits against the
United States, namely, suits upon implied contracts. Earlier in
this paper I have referred to the necessity of drawing lines in the
division of the subjects dealt with in this paper. It seems that some
6f Justice Holmes' opinions which I have classified in this second
division of the paper might well have been placed in the first divi-
sion. Now that we have examined the matter further the arrange-
ment appears justified because the cases which are to be described
now are not contracts with the United States but liabilities claimed
to rest on the United States and they fall within the shadow of the
rule that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent and may
not be charged with liabilities which it has not assumed. Justice
Holmes made this distinction clear in Alabaina v. United States.51
There Alabama brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover
from the United States a tax imposed by the law of the state upon
the privilege of manufacturing and selling hydro-electric power,
and for interest thereon and a penalty for failure to pay. The trans-
action involved was the sale of surplus power generated at Muscle
Shoals. The petition was dismissed in the Court of Claims upon the
merits. Justice Holmes wrote for affirmance but on the ground that
.the petition must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. He pointed
out that dismissal upon the merits implied jurisdiction to deal with
the issues. This did not exist because the Court of Claims was
limited by what is now 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 250 subd. (1) to
actual contracts and if implied they must be implied in fact and
49(1928) 278 U. S. 41,49 S. C. 52,73 L. E. 170.
50(1929) 278 U. S. 427, 49 S. C. 183, 73 L. E. 439.
51(1931) 282 U. S. 502, 51 S. C. 225,75 L. E. 492.
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not by fiction, "or as it is said, by law." He pointed out the distinc-
tion which exists respecting eminent domain where the United
States takes title and is bound to compensation by the provisions
of the Constitution. A tax, Holmes wrote, is not a matter or con-
tract but a "unilateral act of superior power, not depending for its
effect upon concurrence of the party taxed." The rule applied here
is that the sovereign may not be sued without its consent. The con-
verse of the rule is found in the recent case Pope v. United States.52
There the United States, through Congress, after the contractors'
claims had been rejected by the Court of Claims under the existing
law, assumed the liability by a special statute, and authorized suit
in the Court of Claims and review by the Supreme Court. The
rule applied in the Pope case is still that of Alabama v. United
States, namely, an assumption of liability and a consent to suit
upon it.
The other cases in which Holmes wrote opinions which I classify
as belonging here are as follows: American Smelting Co. v. United
States 5 3 holding that a contract for the delivery of copper at a fixed
price is controlling over a claim for a higher price fixed by a War
Agency at a later time and during the period of delivery. The ob-
ligation resting within the realm of assumed obligation cannot be
replaced by an implied obligation arising out of a requisition power
created by statute. Midlen Benevolent Corp v. United States54 is
perhaps applicable also here. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States-
involved an act of the Fuel Administration in requistioning and di-
verting coal which was already covered by contract. It was held
that the fact that it was sold at a lesser price than the price fixed
by the contract did not make the United States liable for the dif-
ference in price on the ground of implied contract. "* * * no law-
making power promises by implication to make good losses that
may be incurred by obedience to its commands." 56 In Pine Hill Co.
v. United States57 it was held that the fixing of prices of coal and
coke under the war powers which were alleged to be unjust and
unreasonable and actually less than the cost of production did not
create an implied contract of indemnity on the part of the United
States nor under any construction of the statute granting the
powers (act of Aug. 10, 1917 C. 53, Sec. 25, 40 Stat. 276, 284).
52(1944) 323 U. S. 1, 65 S. C. 16,89 L. E. 5.
53 (1922) 259 U. S. 75, 42 S. C. 420, 66 L. E. 833.5 4See footnote 39.
55 (1922) 259 U. S. 188, 42 S. C. 481, 66 L. E. 892.5
"At p. 190 of 259 U. S. 188.
57(1922) 259 U. S. 191, 42 S. C. 482, 66 L. E. 894.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"A liability in any case is not to be imposed upon a government
without clear words."58 The facts in United States Grain Corp. v.
Phillips59 were as follows. Gold had been transported from Con-
stantinople to New York on a navy destroyer. The appellant was a
corporation of the United States under the control of the United
States Food Administrator and was performing public functions.
A naval commander was entitled to special compensation under the
Naval Regulations for transporting gold. The gold was offered for
shipment outside of the Regulations and the Navy Department di-
rected that it be so received. No implied obligation arose. The work
was done in the line of duty and the gold was the property of an
agency of the United States. The recent case of United States v.
Beuttas6° is perhaps within the lines of the rule Justice Holmes laid
down in the cases I have last described. In it the contractor sought
to recover on the ground that the subsequent letting of contracts
on adjacent work allowing for higher wages to employees had com-
pelled an increase to the contractors' employees. An allowance made
by the Court of Claims was reversed.
CONCLUSION
In recent years contracts with the United States have become
largely administrative matters. "Termination" has a new and sep-
arate significance. "Renegotiation" has created a new field of quasi-
legal activity. Yet administration law is- not at all a means which has
recently been discovered. It is perhaps more correct to say that in
our time it has become more widely extended and used to supplant
other law forms. There is also little originality or even purposeful
direction in this newer extension of its use. It has perhaps been a
by-product of the vafst commercial and industrial activities which
now accompany modem wars and which have turned nations "for
the duration" into vast socialisms imitative -of the ant hill and the
bee hive. Justice Holmes saw the beginning but not the full develop-
ment of this -modern phenomenon. In Sloan Shipyards v. United
States Fleet Corporation"- we find one of those intuitive reactions
to changing conditions of which there are several in his judicial
work. He could not reconcile vast commercial activities with the
ancient dignity from which the sovereign's immunity had emerged.
He did not feel free to give a loose rein in such conditions. Neither
58At p. 196 of 259 U. S. 191.
5(1923) 261 U. S. 106, 43 S. C. 283, 67 L. E. 552.60(1945) 324 U. S. 768, 65 S. C. 1000; 89 L. E. 921.
61See footnote 31.
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did he attempt to trace the giant oaks to their remote acorns. He
found rather a cultural conflict in the ideas presented. It is one of
those places where instinct and not learning becomes the criterion
of the man. I doubt if Justice Holmes ever was of the opinion that
in the matter of contracts the United Stdtes must be treated like
any other contractor. In many places he suggests expressly and by
implication that the Government does not have the same advantages
in making contracts as private persons. I would point also to the
idea of "public policy" which appears often in his opinions and
which is perhaps best rationalized under the idea of a duty and
the legal doctrine of constructive trust.
The adventures of the barque Thekla in the Courts display one
of those rare bits of artistry in the law which only an all around
workman can achieve. There is a subtle touch and a fairy like bal-
ancing of the traditions of different fields of the law and the final
arrangement and coordination of them all in a magic web which is
a source of both wonder and despair.
